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Part II: "Report of the Operation 'Chungjeong' (loyalty) by the 20th Division" (2 of 3 parts)
Date : 2008-11-19     Hit : 4026

- the full text as provided by the Ministry of Defense (Part 2 of 3)


The facts about the military suppression of the Gwangju Uprising are revealed in detail recently. A report of the 'Chungjeong operation,' the record of the activities by the 20th infantry division and the paratroopers attached to the division, was submitted to the Gwangju Hearing Committee. Document verification team of the committee cross-examined the original copy of the report which was kept in the Central Archives of the Army. The two documents were similar in content. The number of the killed etc., however, betrayed a considerable gap, and it caused controversy. The original copy at the Archive has it that the number of the people shot dead were 17, and that of arrested were 595 while the copy which the Army submitted to the committee says that 4 were killed and 322 were arrested. While the document which the Army submitted to the committee says that 08:00, May 21, the attitude of the Gwangju citizens were favorable to the operation executed by the 20th division, there is no statements similar in content to that in the original copy which reveals that the Army tried to propagate the operation as an act of placation. We publish the full text of the original copy which was kept in the Archive of the Army. The contents which appear only in the submitted copy, but not in the original copy, will be underlined. (Editor)



2.3. Results of the Operation
2.3.1. Achievements
2.3.1.1. The number of rioters arrested by: the divisions - 332; the airborne brigades - 263. Total - 595.
2.3.1.2. The number of rioters killed by: the divisions - 4; the airborne brigades - 13. Total - 17.
2.3.1.3. The arms and ammunitions recovered: carbines - 2, 581; M1s - 445; AR - 14; pistols - 2; machine guns - 16; MG 50s - 1; air rifles - 45. Total - 3,103.
2.3.2. Casualties
KIA - 1; the injured - 5.


Achievements

Casualties

- the killed: 8
- the arrested: 376
- recovered arms and ammunitions from 2,590 rioters
- ammunition recovered: 95,540
- KIA (a rifleman of 62 regiment, No. 15. Byeon Gwang-yeol)
- the wounded: 5



2.3.3. Major Operations
operation
date and time
troops
area
achievement
road blocking
17:00-13:00, May 21
2nd battalion of 61st regiment
Hyocheon Train
Station between
Gwangju and Mogpo
-killed: 3
-arrested: 4
Armed Forces Hospital occupation
17:00-18:00, May 22
2nd battalion of 62nd regiment
road in front of Army Hospital
-killed: 3
-arrested: 25
the Provincial Hall occupation
03:00-06:30, May 27
1st battalion of 61st regiment
the Jeonnam Provincial Hall
-killed: 1
-arrested: 6
Battle at Gyerim Elementary School
03:20-07:30, May 27
2nd battalion of 62nd regiment
Gyerim Elementary School
-killed: 1
-arrested: 15


2.3.4. Commanders and Staffs
2.3.4.1. Division Headquarters
duty
rank
name
graduation
duty
rank
name
graduation
commander
major general
Bag Junbyeong
11th Class
Military Academy
intelligence staff
lieutenant colonel
Sin
Donghun
120th Class B.A. Degree Officer
deputy commander
colonel
Baeg Myeong-yun
13th Class
Military Academy
operational staff
lieutenant colonel
Ham
Deogseon
20th Class
Military Academy
chief of staffs
colonel
No Chunghyeon
157th Class B.A. Degree Officer
logistics staff
lieutenant colonel
I Seungsig
179th Class BA Degree Officer
personnel staff
lieutenant colonel
Hwang Yongnam
21th Class Military Academy
civil affairs staff
lieutenant colonel
Gim Jijo
136th Class B.A. Degree Officer


2.3.4.2. 61 regiment
duty
rank
name
graduation
duty
rank
name
graduation
commander
colonel
Jeong Suhwa
19th Class B.A. Degree Officer
2nd
battalion commander
lieutenant colonel
Yun
Jaeman
21th Class Military Academy
deputy commander
lieutenant colonel
Bag
Jinho
196th Class B.A. Degree Officer
3rd
battalion commander
lieutenant colonel
Gil
Yeongcheol
23th Class Military Academy
1st battalion
commader
lieutenant colonel
I
Byeong-u
195th Class B.A. Degree Officer
4rd battalion commander
lieutenant colonel
Cha Dalsu
202th Class B.A. Degree Officer


2.3.4.3. 62 regiment
duty
rank
name
graduation
duty
rank
name
graduation
commander
colonel
Gim
Dongjin
17th Class Military Academy
2nd battalion
commander
lieutenant colonel
Gim
Hyeonggon
197th Class
B.A. Degree
Officer
deputy commander
lieutenant colonel
I
Jeong-il
131th Class B.A. Degree Officer
3rd battalion
commander
lieutenant colonel
Bag
Jaecheol
190th Class
B.A. Degree
Officer
1 st battalion
commander
lieutenant colonel
Jeong
Yeongjin
23rd Class Military Academy
4th battalion commander
lieutenant colonel
Gang
Yeong-ug
24th Class
Military Academy


2.3.4.4. 63 regiment
duty
rank
name
graduation
duty
rank
name
graduation
commander
colonel
I Byeong-in
15th Class Military Academy
2nd battalion
commander
lieutenant colonel
I Jonggyu
23rd Class Military Academy
deputy commander
lieutenant colonel
I Yeongju
162th Class B.A. Degree Officer
3rd battalion
commander
lieutenant colonel
Yu Hoil
22nd Class Military Academy
1st battalion
commander
lieutenant colonel
O Seong-un
196th Class B.A. Degree Officer
4th battalion commander
lieutenant colonel
Gim
Inhwan
5th Class ROTC


2.4. Reasons of Successful Operation

2.4.1. Surprise Attack
2.4.1.1. The army collected exact informations about activities of the rioters in Gwangju.
2.4.1.2. The army took measures to preserve the operation through developing it only as tentative plans for security reasons. The order was issued only two hours before launching the operation properly.
2.4.1.3. The order of the operation was passed down at once to the 20th and 31th divisions at H-hour not to be exposed. (At 04:00 to the 20th, and at 05:00 to the 31th division respectively.)
2.4.1.4. No wirelesses were used in developing the plans. Instead the officials in charge (the commander in chief, the commander of the divisions, and the commanders of the airborne brigades) met person-to-person to develop the plan.
2.4.1.5. The army disconnected all the communications system of Gwangju before issuing the order to launch the operation.
2.4.1.6. The army mustered the then scattered police in Gwangju and put under the control of army. They were used as guide in executing the operation.
2.4.1.7. The army established an efficient commanding system and succeeded in infiltrating secretly into the city.
2.4.2. With the centralized commanding system, the army enabled an efficient joint operation between airborne forces and infantry units.
2.4.3. Every soldier was well-understood the importance of his task and did his best to defend the nation from danger.
2.4.4. As the army of the nation, we never forgot the sense of duty to protect the life and property of the people.
2.4.5. The army established a centralized commanding system and the commanding officers always were at the head of the troops.
2.4.6. Every soldier was deeply attached to his unit and stood together all the time.
2.4.7. The army made the most of psychological tactics and activities of pacification.
2.4.7.1. The army aired placating broadcast through KBS Broadcasting Station. A mobile broadcasting unit (demanded May 21, 1908) was organized and propagated the messages.
2.4.7.2. Three sets of loud speaker were supplemented. (Asked on May 22, 1980 and set up accordingly.)
2.4.7.3. Microphone systems were set in the vehicles for the commander of battalion and above.
2.4.7.4. Various s were composed and read in the streets.
2.4.7.5. Guidebooks were manufactured and distributed.
- Why did we come to Seoul: 300 copies distributed, one copy to each platoon
- Source books for pacification acts were made and one copy was distributed to each platoon.
- Various handbills were dropped from the airplane and broadcasted.
2.4.8. Vigilance systems of the arms and ammunitions of the police and the reservation army were reexamined and improved.

development

problems

measures

the stage of commitment
(May 20-22)
- Insufficient understanding of the situation made it impossible to execute the mission.
-Demanded orders to be issued after grasping the situation.
-After confrontation with the rioters, the army tried to pacify the citizens.
the stage of blockading operation
(May 21-26)
- Order of active self-defense was as yet issued which caused the shortage of the ammunitions and delayed the distribution. ammunitions were supplemented later.
- Four of six vehicles of the rioters slipped away because of insufficient measure in blockading.
- Provided combat rations was proved short of calories.
- Took measures to keep sufficient ammunitions if the order of active self-defense is not yet issued.
- Various measures, for example, of firing at the tire, strengthening the barricades were taken.
- Substitute foods are expected to be supplemented.
the stage of suppression
(May 26-30)
- Communications malfunctioning. Despite sufficient provision, urban warfare proved to be an obstruction.
- Supplemented Motorrollas.


Addenda

2.5. Addendum 1: The concept of the operation.
2.5.1. The operations were executed subdivided into three parts. Each regiment took responsibility for the operation zone. (Attached- Map #1)
2.5.2. The execution of the Operation was gradated.
i. 1st stage: Securing of the position and scouting.
ii. 2nd stage: After securing and arrangement of the position started house-to-house checkup and searched out the rebellious people.
2.5.3. The troops, after being assigned to the operation zones, were dictated to infiltrate secretly and to strike and suppress the enemy at the same time.
2.5.4. The airborne brigades executed secret infiltration operation at the specified target.
2.5.5. Rearrangement of the forces
i. Watch and beguiling units were expected to open up attacking line and to guide the routes.
ii. Striking units attacked and arrested the enemy.
iii. The task force (one reinforcement unit) was expected to attack and crack down the violently resisting rioters.
iv. The injured or the arrested were to be send back with the help of the reserved unit.
2.5.6. Tactics. In case of confrontation with violent rioters detour immediately and let the task force attack them.
2.5.7. Post tanks or tanks at the places specified in the plan. After occupying the target areas, encamp at the choice place to make the best of the firepower.
2.5.8. Block the outskirts of Gwangju and the roads to the neighboring areas.
2.5.9. Prevent accidental clash between our forces by specifying, for example, a neutral zone or limiting the operation line in advance with the help of each units.
2.5.10. Keep going on to recover the arms seized by the rioters and execute pacification operation.
* Reinforcements after launching the operation
- 18 tanks, nine APCs.
- One 500MD for commanding use and four armed 500MDs. Three UH-1Hs and two AH-1Hs. 40 vehicles.

2.6. Addendum 2. Operation guide
2.6.1. This operation will be named loyalty (i.e., loyalty)
2.6.2. When carrying out the mission at the basement, attack after nullifying the enemy with gas bombs.
2.6.3. When engaged in the battle, point muzzle at the lower part of the belly if possible.
2.6.4. Tanks and APCs will be supplemented at the demand of the commander of the unit posted and the attached force should be submitted to the direction of the commander from the very moment when assigned.
2.6.5. Two policemen will be assigned to each company to be guided to the target when executing operation.
2.6.6. After securing the target area, the operation unit is expected to do best to restore administrative network of the area. For example, normalize the function of the police station and village council, and to summon the police, reservation army and the head of the neighborhood association.
2.6.7. Protect the foreigners, their houses, and celebrities foremost and post the guards.
2.6.8. Do excercise to execute the mission.
2.6.9. Arrest the rioters if possible, if not nullify them.
2.6.10. After securing the target area, post platoons to the strategic places or building where it is easy to observe and defend.
2.6.11. Do best to keep the secret and do not use wirelesses. Codify the wire communication. Authorized personnel only are recommended to develop the operational plans.
2.6.12. Close cooperation among the forces is a must. The mission at the level of platoons, especially, should be executed in conformity with the command of the 20th division.
2.6.13. Try best not to damage the innocent people.
2.6.14. Avoid executing operations on the state roads only. Attack the branch road sometimes. Or attack the both roads alternately.
2.6.15. Be prepared not to clash among the operation units.
(1) In preparation for the case of being confronted with powerful rioters, designate in advance the place to gather afterward.
(2) Take measures to disintegrate TNT set in the building or to incapacitate machine guns.
(3) Take measures to alert enough to the surprise attack of the mobile task force of the rioters.
(4) Take measures to disarm the rioters violently resisting at the cost of civilian's life.

2.7. Addendum 3. The copy text of the orders issued by the CTC
The Combat and Training Command
Gwangju, Jeonnam (CP 040912)
May 26, 1980
Loyalty
The Operation loyalty #4.
Refer to the 1:12,500 map of Korea.
2.7.1. Circumstances: Omitted.
2.7.2. Duty: The CTC should launch the operation loyalty in the operation zone.

2.7.3. The Operation

2.7.3.1. The concept of the operation
(1) As to the operation zone the CTC in charge, divide the zone into Gwangju and the neighboring areas and draw a distinction in executing the operations.

(2) Gwangju Area
i. Subdivide the Gwangju area into two. The divisional forces of the 20th, and 31th are to attack the downtown of the city and clear the remnants of the rioters. And the troops of infantry, artillery, and armor are to block the outskirts of the city. Make sure to accomplish infiltration, surprise attack and suppression simultaneously in stealth.
ii. Rearrangement of the forces
a. Watch and beguiling units were open up attack-line and guide the operation routes.
b. Striking units attack and arrested the enemy.
c. The task forces (one reinforcement unit) was expected to attack and crash down violently resisting rioters.
d.. The injured or the arrested were to be send back with the help of the reserved unit.
iii. Tactics
In case of confrontation with violent rioters detour immediately and let the task force attack them.
iv. Enjoin the agents infiltrated in advance.
v. Post tanks at the places the plan does designate. After occupying the target areas, encamp at the choice place to make the best of the firepower.
vi. Block the outskirts of Gwangju and the roads to the neighboring areas.
vii. Execute infiltration operation at the specified target in stealth. (Extra plan)
viii. Keep going on to recover the arms seized by the rioters and execute pacification operation.

(3) Other neighboring areas
i. Operation zones
1) The 31st division take charge in Jeonnam province except Gwangju.
2) The 35th Division take charge in Jeonbug province.
ii. Execute the operation under the direction of the commanders of the army in the area where the assigned or training forces are. Other areas where there is no troops execute the operation under the direction of the chief of the police individually.
iii. Targets to be secured in the zone
1) The penitentiary should be secured.
2) Others are to be secured according to the priority.
iv. Keep blocking the traffics as well as the main roads.
v. Provide an extra air mobile strike units.

2.7.3.2. The 20th Division
(1) Replenishment
Tank: 18, APC: nine, 500MD for commanding use: one, UH-1H: three, Cobra: two, vehicle: 40.
(2) Execute the operation loyalty in the operation zone in conformity with the order.
(3) Prepare to command the attached airborne units in conformity with the order.

2.7.3.3. 31th Division
(1) Replenishment
Tank: six, APC: three, 500MD for the commanding use : one, UH-1H: one.
(2) Execute the operation loyalty in the operation zone in conformity with the order.
(3) Keep going on to execute the operation loyalty in the Jeonnam province except Gwangju.

2.7.3.4. 35th Division
(1) Replenishment
Tanks:10, 500MD for the commanding use: one.
(2) Keep going on to execute the operation loyalty in the Jeonbug province.

2.7.3.5. Infantry School
(1) Of the three tanks replenished, hand over two to the 20th Division as soon as the operation loyalty begin.
(2) Keep going on to carry out the present task and block the outskirts of the city.

2.7.3.6. Artillery School
(1) Keep going on to carry out the present task and block the outskirts of the city.

2.7.3.7. Armor School
(1) Replenish 15 tanks to the 20th Division.
(2) Replenish six tanks to the 31th Division.
(3) Redeploy three tanks at the Infantry School (in front of Army Hospital) to the 31th Division.
(7) Keep going on to carry out the present task and block the outskirts as the transparency designates.

2.7.3.8. Commanders of the 3rd, 7th, and 11th airborne Brigades
(1) Gather at the airdrome and set the equipments in good condition.
(2) Execute the tasks the CTC took in charge, while preparing mobile striking in conformity with the order.

2.7.3.9. Reserved Forces
(1) The airborne Brigades 3
(2) The airborne Brigades 7
(3) The airborne Brigades 11
(4) Be prepared to be assigned to the divisions 20, and 31 in conformity with the order.

2.7.3.10. Operation Guide
(1) This operation will be named loyalty (i.e., loyalty)
(2) Apply the principles of urban warfare in executing the operation.
(3) When carrying out the mission at the basement, attack after nullifying the enemy with gas bombs.
(4) When engaged in the battle, point muzzle at the lower part of the belly if possible.
(5) Tanks and APCs will be supplemented at the demand of the commander of the unit posted and the attached force should be submitted to the direction of the commander from the very moment.
(6) Do best to preserve the secret and do not use wirelesses. Codify the wire communication. Authorized personnel only are recommended to develop the operational plans.
(7) Pay heed not to inflict any harm on the innocent people.
(8) Prevent accidental clash between the our forces by designating, for example, a neutral zone or limiting the operation line in advance.
(9) Avoid executing operations on the state roads only. Attack the branch road sometimes. Or attack the both roads alternately.
(10) The commander of the units blocking the outskirts of the city and the commanders of the divisions 20, 31 have to execute the operation in close cooperation.
(11) When the operation necessitate reinforcement report and ask it.
(12) Mark our forces in advance to prevent clash among us. (Refer to the communications material.)
(13) This operation will be executed in conformity with the order. (To be delivered at D-day H-hour.)

2.7.4. Administration and Logistics: Refer to the related regulations.
2.7.5. Command system and Communications
2.7.5.1. Communications: Refer the supplementary material A (Communications material distributed already as part of the operation loyalty will do.).
2.7.5.2. Commanding System
(1) Commanding offices of the CTH: the present location.
(2) Commanding offices of the attached units are to be reported after being assigned at the operation zone. So Jun-yeol (the major general of the CTH) and Bag Nam-i (the leading operations staff, colonel) are to receive and notify the report.

 

Part 1| Part 2| Part 3


Source: http://gshin.chonnam.ac.kr/cnu518/4documents.htm#Part%20II:%20%22Report
Rights: The May 18 Institute/Prof. Shin

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