::: The May18 Memorial foundation :::

UDHR@60 - a 518 Multimedia (21)

Nov, 21 2008 04:49:21 GMT

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

ABRIDGED VERSION

The right to democracy. We all have the right to take part in the

government of our country. Every grown-up should be allowed to

choose their own leaders.

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This is an abridged version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. Although the Declaration, which comprises a broad range of rights, is not a legally binding document, it has inspired more than 60 human rights instruments which together constitute an international standard of human rights. These instruments include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which are legally binding treaties. Together with the Universal Declaration, they constitute the International Bill of Rights. For the full text of the Declaration from the United Nations website, go to http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.

UDHR@60 - a 518 Multimedia (20)

Nov, 21 2008 04:42:42 GMT

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

ABRIDGED VERSION

Meet where you like. We all have the right to meet our friends and to

work together in peace to defend our rights. Nobody can make us join a

group if we don't want to.

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UDHR@60 - a 518 Multimedia (19)

Nov, 21 2008 04:35:42 GMT

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

ABRIDGED VERSION

Free to say what you want. We all have the right to make up our

own minds, to think what we like, to say what we think, and to

share our ideas with other people.

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Gwangju Incident by Martial Law Command in June, 1980

Nov, 21 2008 03:50:47 GMT

The violent riot, which had taken place in and around Gwangju caused by university students' demonstrations from May 18 until May 27 when it was suppressed, endangered the national security and obstructed the normal administration of state affairs. In addition, it is an unprecedented tragedy which provoked unstability and anxiety to the people. Fortunately, the order and the stability were regained by the effective suppression of the martial army on May 27. As a martial law commander I hereby give a general description on the development of the Gwangju incident, and disclose the measures to be taken as follows.

1. The background and motivation of the incident

The nationwide demonstrations and sitting-in since last March when schools opened after vacation turned into disturbances and violent riot, which subsided down after the extension of the martial law. However, the street demonstration by approximately 200 Jeonnam National University students continued in Gwangju until May 18. The conflict between demonstrators and the police got so volatile that martial army were dispatched to subside the students who violated the martial law. The conflict between the demonstrators and the martial army gave rise to misunderstanding and unimaginable rumors, which worsen the situation. The Gwangju area became the place of lawless disturbance by armed mobs who had seized weapons.

The mass expression of the political development exceeded the reasonable limitation, and the ensuing violence resulted in disruption of law and order of the society such as destruction of properties, looting, incendiaries, and even killing by the so-called citizen army, which instigated resistance and uprising against the government. Even though this incident was a disturbance by a small number of subversive segments of the senseless mobs, it deserves to a serious incident for all the people to regret over and review.

In this regard, I am giving a brief description of the development of the incident to correct the incorrect understanding on the incident caused by words of mouth along with some mass media reports. This clarification would hopefully help not to repeat this tragic incident which had brought about tremendous national loss.

2. The development of the incident

a. The real fact of the conflict between the army and the demonstrators
The street demonstration which illegally advanced toward the city center by 200 Jeonnam National University students was getting intensified with slogans such as "Repeal the martial law." The number of demonstrators increased to 1,000 at around 2 PM. The situation became uncontrollable for the police to deal with the demonstrators throwing rocks to the police, setting fires on police jeeps.

The martial authority was obliged to dispatch army units to suppress the demonstration with force at around 5:40 PM. The majority of demonstrators were students and they confronted young soldiers with rocks violently. Even some citizens the nearby buildings participated in the violence throwing rocks. The conflict resulted in a number of the wounded in each side. The vigor of the youth of both side, young soldiers and students, exploded into an emotional and verbal insult toward each other. In addition, unimaginable rumors appeared which seemed to have originated from subversive segment of people. Around the whole Gwangju area were the rumors spread which were based on regionalism such "Soldiers from Gyeongsang province were dispatched to sweep away Jeonla province people," or "Soldiers from Gyeongsang province were exclusively selected." They effectively provoked citizens and made the demonstration extremely violent.

These groundless rumors were organized and spread with the intension of provoking innocent citizens and demonstrators by subversive segments and the spies to segregate people and to make the situation worse, disregarding the uncontrollable situation in which the soldiers happened to make violent suppression in front of citizens while having the demonstrators arrested or when they were hit by demonstrators.

b. The disturbance process till it is suppressed
On May 19, with the rumors spread more widely around the city, the mass emotion prevailed the whole city, and the some people without proper reasoning and composure staged violent demonstration, setting fires on police stations and police vehicles. More agitating rumors were created and spread every moment. On May 20, 10,000 agitated demonstrators took to the street setting fire on the MBC Broadcasting Station, destroying the City Hall, running over four policemen in front of the Provincial Hall in the process of demonstration.

On May 21, demonstrators burnt down the building of Gwangju Internal Revenue Service. They also set fire on the CBS Broadcasting Station for revenge and seized 200 items of military and civilian vehicles while attacking the Asia Motors factory, a munition factory. The mobs moved toward the Naju area and the Hwasun area and captured TNT bombs, guns and ammunitions to make themselves fully armed. They even carried out five times of attack in one day to the Gwangju Penitentiary, where 2,700 prisoners were held including 170 leftists with the intention to have the prisoners join in the mob. In the course of attack, mobs fought against the martial army who guarded the prison, resulting in numbers of casualties for each side. Gwangju turned into a horrible city with no law and order.

In addition to the street broadcasting which stimulated citizen to participate in the incident, they carefully published bulletins and underground newspapers, nine issues of which were published from May 18 to 26, to promote the destruction of martial army and to request the release of Gim Daejung. To their accomplishment did they attribute the coincidental resignation of the former prime minister Sin Hyeonhwag and his cabinet members in the same date. They spread the rumor saying, "President Choe is going to resign soon." and encouraging mobs and agitating citizens to participate in the demonstration.
On the one hand, the army retreated toward the suburban area on the night of May 21 to avoid an unfortunate result to properties and lives of innocent citizens which might have been inflicted from the conflict with the armed mobs. On the other hand, the army blockaded the city from the outside, concentrating on the suppression of the disturbance in the other areas, and without exercising even the least self-defence measure by the strict order to the martial army not to shoot even one bullet.
On May 22, Gwangju was totally under the control of the armed mobs, and the lawless state continued. Armed mobs exhibited dead bodies in the square in front of the provincial hall, trying to mobilize citizens with the laughable show of a so-called combined funeral. In the meantime, the plunder and looting by the mobs were extremely rampant. Citizens were disillusioned in the process, and the number of citizens participating in the demonstration began to decrease, and the mob largely consisted of gangsters and subversive segments aimed at specific political gains. Students consisted of only 30% of the mob.

However, the mobs drove the city into the state of siege by their extreme riot.

On May 23, some influential people and moderate students organized the Settlement Committee and retrieved weapons and tried to negotiate with the government. However, the committee produced no result due to the conflict with the hard-liners, while the retrieved weapons were seized by the hard-liners, who exhibited bodies of victim as a way to attract citizens who wanted to burn incense for the dead. Particularly on this day, some would-be moderate members of the settlement committee visited the Regional Martial Law Command and asked for the release of arrested demonstrators and the exemption of their responsibility on the one hand. They spreaded rumors such as "More disturbances were taking place in support of Gwangju incident," or "Friendly countries are supposed to support us" around the Gwangju city.
On May 24, the mobs held a citizens rally under the excuse of the consolation ceremony of victim's soul with 15,000 people with the purpose of holding a rally to amass more support to them. After the burning ceremony of a certain person's effigy, however, they postponed the consolation ceremony. While the settlement committee was divided into hard-liners and moderates regarding the ways of settlement, the riot continued.

On May 25, the settlement committee did not make any progress with itself divided into two, while the hard-liners held a rally with 50,000 citizens participating, asking for the release of Gim Daejung and the abolition of the martial law. They also paraded through the downtown area. However, with the participation of citizens decreasing, the mobs tried to boost the morale of the citizens, saying "The martial army can not advance to the city," "Five more days are enough to gain the victory," "The situation has become favorable to us," and "Participate in the citizen army to gain victory."

On May 26, just the day before the martial army advanced and suppressed the riot, hard-liner mobs promptly responded to the changing situation by dispatching task forces to appropriate positions. They also propagandized that the martial army broke the promise and were going to advance to the city center, and that the citizens should be ready for the advance. As a result, at around 3 PM. an estimated 5,000 people gathered and had a protest rally and a street demonstration.

Even though the beginning of this incident is caused by the irrational conflict between the martial army and Jeonnam National University students, a careful review of the development of the incident during the nine-day-period shows that there were systematic control of the development and the tactful manipulation of the citizens from behind into riot. In addition, I want to point that

First, the evidences revealed a manipulation of the incident by spies and some subversive segments who cooperated with spies. It coincided with the result of investigation of I Chang-yong, a spy who landed by the west seashore and infiltrated to Gwangju and then moved to Seoul tried to expand the espionage activities, who was arrested on May 23.

Secondly, the evidences also revealed that Gim Daejung had controlled students of Jeonnam National University and Joseon University (mainly students who finished their military service and started school again) behind the curtain for his hidden political gain. While the situation and the incident were getting worse, some people who blindly followed Gim worsened the incident systematically.

c. Major controllers behind the curtain and their activities
Right after the declaration of nationwide martial law at 24:00 on May 17, Jeong Dongnyeon (37, junior student in Chemistry, Jeonnam National University) controlled the demonstration along with other students who came back to the university after military service. They had been controlled to stage demonstration for democracy by Gim Daejung since the middle of April when they met Gim and received "Soul of the National" and "Speech at Hansin and Donggug Universities" written by him. Then they manipulated student council president Bag Gwanhyeon and presidents of colleges to instigate students to bring rocks in their school bags when they came to school. After throwing rocks to the martial army in front of the main gate of Jeonnam National University, students moved to the city center in order to attract the citizens' participation.

Gim In-weon (senior student in Law, Joseon University) met Gim Daejung along with 19 other students before they came back to Gwangju. He instigated I Ujeong (senior student in Korean Literature) through the contact with Yang Huiseung (sophomore student in Politics, representative of Committee of Struggles for Democratization of Joseon University) to lead demonstration with other 12 members of the Committee and to take part in the street demonstration with Jeonnam National University students.

Hong Namsun (a lawyer) met Gim Daejung six times after the October Assassination of President Bag Jeonghui. In the end of April, he procured 50 pieces of subversive political brochures called "List of Convicted of Gim Daejung Incident" and had Gim Ungi (sophomore student in Business, who finished military service) spread them in Joseon University campus. In addition, he controlled and encouraged students from behind. When the mobs conquered the Provincial Hall, he visited the students with hard-line committee members such as priest Gim Singeun under the excuse as a member of the Citizens' Settlement Committee from May 23 to 26. He even gave students 1,000,000 won. He instigated the mobs, saying, "Don't return weapons until your requirements are satisfied," "Five more days of struggle will bring the victory," and "Add some political issues to your requirements."

Gim Jongbae (27, junior student in International Trade) took the position of the so-called Struggle Committee chair. throwing out Gim Weongab (who failed in college entrance exam twice) from the position which Gim Weongab originally had taken in the Provincial Hall since May 21. Gim Jongbae insisted that a university student had to lead the mobs. He appointed Heo Gyujeong (sophomore, Engineering College of Joseon University) as administrative section chief, Jeong Sang-yong (31, sales chief of Boseong Industry) as external section chief, Gim Yeongcheol (33, YWCA credit union) as planning section chief, Bag Namseon (26, truck driver) as information section chief, Yun Seogru (24, ceramic worker) as task force chief, and Gim Junbong (21, a business employer) as a spokesman. With this organization shows that he planned a long-term struggle.
Bag Namseon, information section chief, took the control of the operation in the Provincial Hall on May 23. He and Yun Seogru, task force chief, opposed the plan for returning weapons and ordered the mobs to be armed again. He also ordered to shoot back to the martial army. Furthermore he planned to suicide exploding the tremendous amount of TNT and hand grenade in the Provincial Hall if the situation went wrong. He also planned to continue their struggle until the last moment if their requests are not met.

At around 8:00 PM on May 26, an anonymous man at around 33 of age, who insisted that he was a retired captain, organized a task force of 50 mobs in the YWCA gymnasium independently from the task force of the Provincial Hall. He trained his men to handle guns and supplied a number of guns and bullets in cooperation with information chief Bag Namseon. Then he organized four groups of 10 or 12 people each, and deployed them at the Provincial Hall, at the entrance to Mt. Mudeung Villa, in front of the south Gwangju Train Station, and in front of Gwangju High School. He was arrested, while waiting after finishing his own preparation to fight against the martial army.

3. Inevitability of suppression by force

The army restrained from exercising the least self-defense measure to prevent common innocent people from being hurt or useless blood from being shed. Even one gun shot was fired to prevent the deterioration of the incident even when soldiers were stabbed to death by the hands of the mobs and when the city turned into lawless chaos by the armed.
In addition, we found that it was not wise to station the martial army inside the city. The army retreated to the suburban area on May 21, and was engaged in blockage exercising an extreme patience while waiting for the effort of citizens to pacify the situation. Furthermore, a statement by Prime Minister Bag Chunghun on May 21, another special statement in the Gwangjuarea by the President on 25th, and another statement by the martial law commander were announced to sincerely ask for the self restraint and restoration of order.

In spite of these efforts, the situation continued to get deteriorated, and the effort by citizens to find a way for settlement went nowhere. The mobs regarded themselves as a citizen army. They even set up encampments around the Mudeung Mountain, Hwasun and other mountainous areas outside the city, getting ready for a long-term guerilla warfare. In the provincial hall, tremendous amount of TNT bombs were loaded for self-destruction. The situation reached the point when the army could not exercise any more patience.

In this critical moment, the martial army succeeded in removing the fuse of explosives and neutralizing machine guns by one of its agents who had infiltrated in the mob and a member of the mob who had been persuaded to cooperate. In the process, one was killed and another was severly wounded. Even though we paid a dear price for the preliminary operation, we succeeded in avoiding a tragic damages in each side during the suppression on May 27. We also tried to minimize the damage to the innocent citizens by classifying innocent citizens from mobs before the final operation.

4. The state of damage

Casualties: Killed are 144 civilian, 22 soldiers, and four policemen. Wounded are 127 civilians, 109 soldiers, and 144 policemen.

The civilian casualties were made when heavily armed mobs attacked Gwangju Penitentiary five times from May 20 to 22, using the armored vehicles, trucks and jeeps seized from a defense industry and soldiers. During this conflict, 28 people died and 70 people were wounded at a skirmish between the martial army guarding the prison and the mobs. 32 casualties caused by traffic accidents which happened while the mobs were moving to lead demonstrations and to seize the weapons, and 15 people were killed accidental shooting caused by mobs who were not experienced in dealing with weapons such as guns and hand grenades. 17 mobs were killed while resisting the martial army. Some other casualties were caused by conflict between hard-line and moderate mobs. We expect a further clarification of the casualties will be given as the examination is still in progress. It should be noted that high casualties of the army and the police was a result from the extreme self restraint of the martial army while expecting the demonstrators to exercise their own restraint at the beginning of the incident.

Damages on military ordnance: the mobs seized 5401 items of military supplies including machine guns, light machine guns, automatic rifles, M16s, M1s, Calvin rifles, handguns, etc. during this incident. Now 80% of these seized weapons were retrieved. They seized 289,543 bullets, 552 hand grenades, and 3600 boxes of TNT, 70% of which has been retrieved. They also seized 318 items of trucks and armored vehicles, most of which are not usable being totally destroyed.
Damages on civilian items: it is estimated that the damage would reach 26,000,000,000 won in the civilian side. The amount is expected to rise with more result of the investigation disclosed. Eight public buildings were burnt down including Gwangju Internal Revenue Service. 13 public building were partially damaged, 68 vehicles were burnt or damaged, and other 650 items were burnt.

Eight civilian buildings were burnt down including the MBC Broadcasting Station along with its broadcasting facilities. 43 additional buildings were damaged including Gwangju Catholic Center. 381 vehicles, 3000 drums of oil were burnt or consumed. The Asia motors factory, a munition factory, was given the severest damage with 414 vehicles including 314 military and 82 civilian cars and 18 trains.

5. Arrests and measures to be taken on them

The number of the arrests: Since the violent incident took place in and around Gwangju on May 18, 1740 participants have been under arrest by the martial law authority. 1,100 of them have been released. and 730 are still under examination. 686 are from Jeonnam and 26 are from Seoul. This statistics suggests that there was human input from other areas such as Seoul.

The age of 315 participants are under 20's and 310 are in their 20's, 77 are above 30's, 28 are above 40's, which shows that most of the participants did not experience Korean war.

The occupations of 153 participants are high school or university students (including 24 who will take a university entrance exam), 126 unemployed, 83 factory workers, 79 other laborers, 55 drivers, 47 farmers and merchants, 44 shop keepers, and 37 white color employees, and 59 miscellaneous jobs.

Measures to be taken on them: The extent of this incident is beyond imagination and it should have been impossible without presupposing an existence of an underground group which manipulated this incident from behind. The mobs seized explosives, weapons and ammunitions which can inflict a blood shed to a large number of people. They use the weaponry to manipulate people. In addition, there is a strong possibility of the existence of group controlling the incident from behind. For example, the high level skills in dealing with the explosives, the movement of the martial army being transmitted to the provincial hall monitor room, and instant reactions of the mobs.

Investigation following the suppression reveals that some participants possessed subversive documents and underground newspapers at home. House-search of the subversive participants produced many illegal documents and underground newspapers, Rumors were promptly created and immediately spread to innocent citizens who were manipulated by numerous tactics often blaming the martial army for atrocities they committed. A number of mobs attacked Gwangju Penitentiary five times and set up machine guns nearby and kept shooting with the clear purpose of stimulating an revolt in the prison.

With all the above mentioned crimes in consideration, we are planning to find out and reveal the group behind the scene. In addition, we will pick out the murderers, criminals, and radicals to be court-martialed and to be strictly punished. However, simple participants, sympathizers, and trivial criminals will be released to resume their business.

6. A request

We believe that there should not be such a tragic incident repeated especially based on regionalism, whatever the reason and the motivation of the incident might have been, or whoever might be responsible.

We admit that the armed forces made mistakes in relation with the residents during this incident. Accordingly, we are planning to take appropriate measures. At the same time, we want to show our sincere regret regarding this matter. Again we want to ask all people to take a lesson from the Gwangju Incident in overcoming the national crisis.

Source: http://gshin.chonnam.ac.kr/cnu518/4documents.htm#Part%20IV:%20Gwangju%20Incident
Rights: The May 18 Institute/Prof. Shin

AFAD Strongly Condemns the Abduction, Beating and Detention of Atty. Parvez Imroz

Nov, 20 2008 05:47:47 GMT

AFAD Strongly Condemns the Abduction, Beating and Detention

of Atty. Parvez Imroz, Firdous Ahmed Sofi and Ajaz Ahmed Mir of India

The Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), a regional federation of human rights organizations working directly on the issue of enforced or involuntary disappearance, strongly condemns the arrest, beating and detention of Atty. Parvez Imroz and his two associates, Firdous Ahmed Sofi and Ajaz Ahmed Mir. The arrest took place at 12:30 noon on Monday, November 17, in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir. To this writing, the three are still detained.

AFAD learned about this condemnable incident from an urgent appeal sent by the Jammu & Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS), our partner-organization in Kashmir. According to said appeal, JKCCS President Parvez Imroz along with a team of around 50 volunteers composed of journalists, human rights activists, trade union activists from within and outside Kashmir, were monitoring the first phase of the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislative Assembly Election.

Monitoring the elections is a usual activity of the JKCCS along with civil society groups from various parts of India. It is recalled that the group also monitored the Assembly Elections of 2002 and the parliamentary elections in 2004. Accordingly, Advocate Parvez Imroz and his two companions, Firdous Ahmed Sofi and Ajaz Ahmed Mir, were arrested when they reached the place where a protest demonstration was going on.. The three were allegedly beaten up by the police in front of media men and were later taken to the Police Station in Bandipora.

December 9, 2008 is the 10^th anniversary of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. Moreover, December 10, 2008 is the 60^th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this connection, abducting, beating and detaining human rights defenders like Atty. Parvez Imroz and his two companions should never be done by agents of the Indian government.

Atty. Parvez Imroz is an internationally-known human rights defender and a recipient of the Ludovic-Trarieux International Human Rights Prize in 2006. He was also the representative of their human rights organization, the Srinagar-based Association of the Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), during the initial conceptualization and founding of our Asian-wide Federation for the disappeared and is presently AFAD's Council member. It is, indeed, absurd to abduct, beat and detain him and his two companions because of their human rights activities. Certainly, their continuing detention is detrimental to the international posturing of India which poses itself as the "biggest democracy" in the world.

It is worrying to note that because of his work, Parvez Imroz has indeed earned the ire of the powers-that-be in the country that boasts itself as the biggest democracy in Asia. It has been more than three years since his passport has not been renewed and very obviously, such act by the Indian government can be obviously interpreted as constraining Imroz' mobility with the desperate intention of keeping his mouth shut on the sorry state of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir, thus, constraining his capability to tell the international security about the skeletons inside the closet in this beautiful yet sad valley of Kashmir.

Furthermore, on June 30, 2008 at 10:00 p.m., 4 armed men, believed to be policemen, knocked at the house of Mr. Imroz. When asked of their identity by Mr.. Imroz' wife, Rokhsana, the men were aggressively calling on Mr. Imroz to open the door and come out. Aware of the intimidation he received days earlier because of the work of the International People's Tribunal on Human Rights, Mr. Imroz immediately informed his brother, Sheik Mustaq Ahmad through the backdoor. Mr. Ahmad reportedly shined a torch at Mr. Imroz door and asked the persons in front to identify themselves only to be aggressively ordered to put off the torch. Mr. Imroz nephew came out of Mr. Ahmad's house, afraid that Mr. Imroz might have been taken away. This forced the armed men to leave, but only after firing a shot in the dark believed to be pointing towards the direction of Mr. Imroz' nephew. The perpetrators threw a grenade that exploded in Mr. Imroz' compound. On their way back, the perpetrators beat a male neighbor.

In view of the above, AFAD strongly calls on the Indian government -

�� To release Atty. Parvez Imroz, Firdous Ahmed Sofi and Ajaz Ahmed Mir from detention at the soonest possible time, and

�� To ensure that those who are responsible for the arrest, beating and detention of the three human rights defenders be brought to justice in urgency.

�� To be true to India's being a signatory to the UN Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance which provides for the right of families of the disappeared and their organizations to organize themselves, thus, the government should give Parvez Imroz and his colleagues in the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons their freedom to form their association and work for truth, justice, redress, memory for the disappeared and other victims of human rights violations.

In positively responding to our urgent calls above, India proves that it is, indeed, "the biggest democracy" in the world.

Signed and authenticated by:

MUGIYANTO MARY AILEEN D. BACALSO

Chairperson Secretary-General
Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD)
Rms. 310-311 Philippine Social Science Center Bldg.,
Commonwealth Ave., Diliman, 1103 Quezon City

Phone: 00-632-9274594
Telefax: 00-632-4546759
Website: www.afad-online.org

UDHR@60 - a 518 Multimedia (18)

Nov, 20 2008 02:51:28 GMT

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

ABRIDGED VERSION

Freedom of thought. We all have the right to believe in what we want to believe,

to have a religion, or to change it if we want.

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Who is responsible for the shooting in Gwangju? ( Last part of 2)

Nov, 20 2008 02:17:01 GMT

... continued from Part 1

by Jong-yeol Bag, Reporter of Dong-a Ilbo

Who Ordered to Fire?

Assemblyman Jeong Ung: On May 20 in Gwangju, two hundred taxies demonstrated, and on May 21 some demonstraters used buses to get out of the city. Though the Operation Chief of the Army HQ ordered me to stop them using tanks and armed helicopters, I didn't follow the order since I assumed that it was not right to use the heavily armed units to suppress the demonstration. On May 25, Regional Martial Law Commander General So ordered me to submit a plan to deal with demonstrations, so I submitted my opinion in a document, in which I said that the best way to control the situation is to use a political method instead of a high-handed physical method armed units. From this circumstance, I assume that the order to shoot was determined by Regional Martial Law Commander General Yun Heungjeong and Special Operations Commander General Jeong Hoyong who was participating in the operation after paratroopers asked for permission to shoot. It is also noticeable that May Association of the Injured insisted that the casualty took place on May 20 even though the order of self-defense was given at 18:00 on May 21.

Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil: Is it true that during the Gwangju Incident, Regional Division Commander, who commanded operational forces including paratroopers, asked for the permission to open fire and notified the order to open fire to the operating units?

Minister O Jabog: Martial Law Commander's order of self-defense confirmed individuals of the martial army that they had the right to use their weapons in certain situation and that they should follow the guidelines not to abuse the weapons. The use of self-defense was promulgated by Martial Law Commander at 19:30 on May 21, and then it was given to the Regional Martial Law Commander at 20:30 on the same date, and then again to the Head of the 2nd Branch Martial Law Bureau at 10:30 on May 22. The right self-defense was proclaimed to be in effect as of 12:00 on May 22 by the Martial Law Commander.
Documents on the operation show that twelve hundred soldiers were surrounded by more than 100,000 demonstrators, while guarding the Provincial Hall. They were under the danger of being attacked by rifles and armored vehicles and other cars of the armed demonstrators. The order of shooting was proved to be given by an anonymous officer in order to protect his soldiers. This shooting is an individual measure of self-defense justified by Criminal Law Clause 21, and an act of self-defense in unavoidable circumstances while executing the official duties justified by Criminal Law Clause 21. This was a purely individual measure of self-defense, but not a measure following the order of the higher ranking officers.
Regional Martial Law Commander General Yun Heungjeong and Operation Staff General Jang Sabog confirmed me that they got memorandum of unknown number from Regional Division Commander General Jeong Ung asking for the permission to open fire several times, but they did not give the permission. It is also known that Regional Division Commander did not order to open fire to his units.

PDP's response: Minister of Defense O said that he confirmed from the then Regional Martial Law Commander General Yun Heungjeong and operation staff General Jang Sabog that they got unknown number of memorandums for the permission to open fire, even though they did not give the permission.

However, on July 5, 1988, the day when Minister O gave a false witness, he called Assemblyman Jeong Ung and said, I have never recieved any question about the order of opening fire and I have not received any memorandum on the permission General Jeong Ung to open fire during the Gwangju Uprising. The following circumstances clearly prove that it is false that General Jeong Ung.

- General Jeong Ung opposed the violent suppression of the demonstration on the night of May 19;
- General Jeong Ung was called to the commanders' meeting at Gwangju Airport on May 26. There is no reason not to call him to the meeting if he was cooperative with the so-called reform group of that time to the extent that he asked for the permission to open fire.
- General Jeong Ung was relieved from his position as of June 4, 1980 and was forced to retire on September 30, 1980 even though there was nothing wrong with his personal record.
- On the 11th general election, he was arrested without warrant, tortured and forced to give up his bid for the Assembly.
- He was intimidated and even fire bombed last year when he was appointed as a vice chair for the Association of Democratic Movement.

DJP's response: We will disclose the evidence of General Jeong's Order to open fire in the next Special Committee.

Dispute on the Order to Open Fire

After the DJP disclosed its comment on the shooting, Assemblyman Jeong Ung responded to the question of his memorandum, saying, I never submitted any memorandum to get the permission to open fire. I do not know if some of my staff submitted that memorandum without my permission. He added that the truth will be found in the committee.
The time and as well as the chain of command will be disputed because both Martial Army and citizens claimed that the other side fired first and their shooting was an act of a self defense.

While Minister of Defense O disclosed that the firing is a self-defense based on the time of fire, the then Martial Law Commander I Huiseong witnessed in his letter submitted to the National Reconciliation Committee. On May 21 the martial army was placed in the suburban areas to minimize the casualties of both sides, and an appeal was made to the people on the 7:30 national broadcast with a warning of execution of the right of self-defense. The self-defense is based on the martial law clause 15 item 2, and the code of conduct of armed forces personnels clause 233, and police forces code of conduct clause 7, which specify the circumstances in which police and armed forces are allowed to use fire arms.... The execution of the self-defense was given to the lower units as Martial Law commands number 11 as of May 22. The order also asked for their understanding on the unavoidable circumstances.

I Huiseong's testimony does not specify the exact time of shooting. However, Assemblyman Jeong claimed in the previous speech to the National Assembly that the execution of self-defense right of the army was given at 18:00 on May 21. However, May Association of the Injured of the Gwangju Uprising said that they were shot on May 20. So there is a time difference between two assertions regarding the moment of shooting. While answering to the National Assembly, Minister of Defense O also admitted that at 13:30 on May 21 one of the officers fired at the demonstrators as a means of warning. The exact time of shooting will remain a controversy in the Investigation Committee.

It is asserted by several books on the Gwangju Uprising that the first shooting was done at 1:30 May 21 by the martial army. The books include Gwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age, refer to the glossary Operation Order: An Extravagant Leave, and Democratization Movement in the 1980's: Gwangju Uprising Documentation and the First Half of the Decades Diary.

About the Responsibility of 31st Division Commander Jeong Ung

Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil: The comment related to Gwangju incident by Assemblyman Jeong Ung seems to be intended to avoid the liability on several matters the Regional Division Commander should be responsible for Gwangju Incident. Who takes the responsibility for local disturbances which took place under the martial law and the public security which was not guaranteed, because hundred kinds of weapons and mobile equipments were robbed. What should have been measured for this commander? I understand, especially, the situation became deteriorated as citizens were getting armed with weapons and bullets of the Reserved Forces which was robbed in Gwangju area. Then who takes the responsibility for the safety of weapons and bullets in Gwangju and Jeonla province. In my opinion, if the commander who couldn't manage weapons and bullets under his control and even had been robbed them, he should be prosecuted. However, who takes the responsibility?

Minister of Defense O Jabog: Regarding the direct command responsibility for the suppression of Gwangju incident, General Jeong Ung was responsible during the period from May 17 to 21, and the Regional Martial Law Commander So Jun-yeol was after the transfer of the right of command. I expect that the matter of responsibility will be cleared at the investigation by the Investigation Committee. of Gwangju Incident.

The primary responsibility of the weapons and bullets of the Reserved Forces lies on the police and the persons in charge of the Reserved Forces units. The secondary responsibility lies on General Jeong Ung, who commanded the martial army in Gwangju area under the martial law. Immediately after the incident, General Jeong Ung was relieved from his position due to his responsibility. In this case, he should have been subjected to trial by courtmartial to clarify his responsibility during his service as a Division Commander. I will ask the then Martial Law Commander General I Huiseong General for his opinion and will give a further response.

DJP's response: We consider the dispute over false testimony raised by Peace Democracy Party as a political ploy to avoid the responsibility of Assemblyman Jeong Ung in the Investigation Committee.
Evaluation of the Military Operation to Suppress Gwangju Incident

Assemblyman Jeong Ung: The military authority still assess the Gwangju operation as a honorable success in the history of the armed forces. Is it really a successful operation even if the armed forces massacred the people? Is this operation a historic one which will be glorified for the history of army?

Minister O Jabog: I do not think that I should repeatedly characterize the Gwangju Incident, its development and the achievement of the military operation at this moment. Gwangju incident itself was the crisis of the nation. Nobody doubts that the army had played a decisive role to protect the country from the crisis. We concluded that the final operation on May 27 was inevitable to immediately settle the situation, because the anarchy prevailed for ten days in the absence of law enforcement to guarantee the security and welfare of the people. I think that we should not diminish the morale nor damage the honor of the armed forces regarding the Gwangju Incident.

Mr. So Jun-yeol testified last February in the National Reconciliation Committee, in which he asserted that he ordered the army not to kill even one citizen because even one victim is our own victim. He remembered that it was the continuance of difficult moments as a commander. General So commented on the doubt of some people regarding the martial army's lack of effort to persuade citizen army before it began its final operation. He said, Before we began the operation, we did our best through various means including leaflets. It was difficult to fly helicopters because there was a machine gun of caliber 50. He continued, It is lucky that the final operation made it possible to reduce the casualty. Many people asked me why there was an uncontrollable expansion of the incident. But I was simply in charge of the settlement, and I do not know of much about the previous development.

Cheon Geumseong's book describes the scene touchingly after the suppression operation: In the morning on May 27, the sun is rising with its full brightness onto the wreckage of Gwangju. Guided by General Jeong Hoyong, Minister of Defense Ju Yeongbog repeatedly said, I expected more than 500 casualties, and that was the reason that we postponed this operation. I am impressed by this faultless operation! The national anthem accompanied the national flag being hoisted on the flag stone at the roof of the Provincial Hall, while Minister Ju stood there accompanied by General Jeong Hoyong, General So Jun-yeol, and General Bag Junbyeong (October Assassination, December 12 Coup, and Gwangju Incident).

The Most Outstanding Issue: the Number of the Dead

Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil: What I heard in the last hearing of National Reconciliation Committee was that the martial army used only M16 guns in the Gwangju Incident, but how people got shot by M1s, carbines, machine guns, and how there were people who were run over by military trucks? What is the number of the victims and why that happened? And among the people who died, how many were civilians, and how many were soldiers and policemen?

Minister O Jabog: According to the autopsy report of the people who died in the Gwangju Incident and related data, among the 190 dead people, 163 were civilians, 23 were soldiers, and four were policemen, and the 135 of dead civilians were died from gunshot wounds and four were died from stab wounds, 17 from bruises, and seven from vehicle-related accidents. Among the 135 who died from gunshot wounds, 98 deaths were by carbine rifles and other guns.

Since the martial army was carrying out their duty only using M16 rifles, the 37 deaths by M1s and carbine rifles, which the martial army did not carry at that time, were estimated to be yielded by accidental firings between demonstration groups, by stray bullets which demonstration groups fired, and by collisions between demonstration groups after the demonstrating crowd were armed, and I assume that some people were bruised and injured by vehicle accidents in the process of the demonstrating crowd's violent demonstration and their disorderly operation of the vehicles that they snatched from others.
On the other hand, the number of the dead seems to be the most outstanding issue in the debate of the Gwangju Hearing Committee, because the viewpoints of the government and the opposition side are far apart.

In the Truth of the Gwangju Uprising, which was published on December 14 last year, Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) claimed that 1,000 were killed in the Gwangju Uprising, which is smaller figure than the 2,000 deaths that the related organizations of the May Uprising claimed so far, they present the testimony of the U.S. ambassador William Gleysteen for the basis: In fact, at least more than 1,000 were dead. But up to recent time, the government has maintained firmly the same as Army headquarters officially announced in June, 1980 in the Truth of the Gwangju Incident, that the number of the dead is less than 200.

However, the victims of the Gwangju Incident including the ones who were injured in the incident regard this government announcement as false one and distrust it, and for the ground of their distrust, they lodge the suspicion to the Gwangju Annual Report, which the Assembly member Mun Jeongsu commented on, the secret burial of the victims and cremation, and testimonies that people are not asked to identify themselves. The victims are sure that the number of people who actually died is bigger than the government announcement says.

Last February in National Reconciliation Committee, I Gwang-yeong, who was wounded in the May Uprising, insisted that
The number of the dead which the government announced only indicates the
ones that were in the morgues of each hospital such as Christian Hospital, Red
Cross Hospital, and Jeonnam National University Hospital. The announcement
did not even include the number of the dead in Armed Forces Hospital and the
huge number of the dead, who loaded away by the martial army trucks is
excluded. Then, Gi Jongdo, who was a garbage man in a district office, was
unexpectedly put in jail and died after the Gwangju Incident, and I directly heard from him that he moved dead people by garbage trucks and he knows where the people are buried.

But So Jun-yeol, the then Regional Martial Law Commander, refuted against I Gwang-yeong's claim in the testimony at National Reconciliation Committee, saying, According to the result of my thorough investigation, at least the number of the dead is correct as announced after the initial investigation. I give my word to this on my honor. We then accepted reports of disappearance freely, but there was no other report. At that time, the martial army was carrying M16s and the citizens' army carrying M1s and carbines, and after the autopsy of the corpses, it turned out that only 45 were shot dead by M16s.
Meanwhile, O Gugbang testified at the hearing in last July saying that 98 were killed by M16s, and it is also different from So Jun-yeol's testimony. And the previously issued material of the Ministry of Defense showed another difference. The Truth of Gwangju Incident reported that after the autopsy of 128 deaths by gunshot wounds, it was confirmed that 29 were killed by M16s, 47 were by machine guns, and 52 were by carbines or M1s.

The number of the dead is different from each material and each testimony: the material of the Ministry of Defense said it's 29; General So Jun-yeol testified in National Reconciliation Committee that it's 45; O Gugbang's reply at National Assembly in last July indicated that the number is 98, and Gwangju citizens are confused by them.

Concerning the matter of the dead, people who are related to the Gwangju Incident still have doubts about the deaths reported after the repression of the demonstration on the last day of the Gwangju Incident (May 27) and about the number of day laborers, career women, and people without relations among the dead. The government enlisted the people who were dead during the Gwangju Incident once again recently, but it is reported that there is not a big change. People are still expecting to hear satisfactory answer for 'the number of the dead' in the next hearing committee, but since eight years have passed already after the incident, it is uncertain how close we can get to the substantial truth.

Particularly, the doubts about the number 2,627, which is recorded in Gwangju Annual Report as dead in June, 1980--Jeong Seogmo, the Minister of Internal Affairs, explained that this was written wrong--is well posed in the statement of the National Committee for Memorial Projects for the Victims of May 18 Gwangju People's Uprising, which retorted the report of Yun Seongmin, the Minister of Defense, on June 7, 1985. We are expecting to have proper explanation for this.

The Intervention of the U.S. and Its Responsibility

Assemblyman Jeong Ung: I Huiseong, the Martial Law Commander of the day, said that the martial army, which was consisted of the paratroops and the 20th division upon the incident of the Gwangju Uprising, could not be called out without the recognition of the Commander of Korean-American Allied Forces; and the U.S. Department of State agreed to transfer unspecified number of Korean soldiers to subdue the turbulent situation of Korea on May 22; then who is telling the truth? Was the martial army called out after the recognition of the Commander of Korean-American Allied Forces or were they called out without it?

Minister O Jabog: The units that were committed to Gwangju at that time were the three paratroops brigades and the 20th division of infantry. According to the strategic directions no. 1 of Korean-American Armed Service Committee of July 28, 1978, the three paratroops brigades submitted to the Special Operations Command usually are not under the controls of Korean-American Allied Forces. Regarding the 20th division, as the right of commanding the military operations of the 20th division was undertaken from the Allied Forces upon the October Assassination of president Bag in 1979 already and the command of military operations of the unit was wholly reverted to Korean army, there shouldn't be any disagreement on that matter between Korea and the United States.

While, on the standpoint with the U.S., the Martial Law Commander I Huiseong told the similar point with Minister O's reply at National Assembly in a written statement:

As the Gwangju incident being deteriorated, the Martial Law Command reinforced two brigades of paratroops additionally and on both May 20 and 21, they dispatched more divisions from somewhere in Gyeonggi province. The division was concentrated in the suburbs of Seoul, not under the command of the Allied Forces Headquarter in Korea, so that it could be used for martial purpose anytime, anywhere. The military force of paratroops can be used without the consent of Allied Forces Headquarters. Therefore, the misunderstanding that the Commander of Allied Forces in Korea supported military force for the purpose of suppressing the Gwangju Incident should be eradicated.

On July 11, Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement with regard to the U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Incident, urged the U.S. to reveal the measure of withdrawing Americans living in Gwangju just before May 18 to the outskirts; and the role of the U.S. government which approved the calling out of troops; frequent contacts between the U.S. authorities and the new military faction on the May 17 declaration of the martial law around May 17. The committee particularly demanded an explanation from the U.S. about its responsibility to the calling out of the 20th division from DMZ: The 20th division is under the command of the Korean-American Allied Forces Command. On May 22, 1980, the spokesman of the U.S. Department of State announced that the U.S. agreed to the calling out of the 20th division and later Gleysteen asserted same thing, but Lilley, in the recent interview with Dong-a Ilbo, contrarily asserted that the 20th division was reverted to the command of Korean army. Why the utterances of the ambassadors of same country are that different?

Disclosing the Truth of the Gwangju Uprising, Will that happen?

Since the birth of the Fifth Republic, the Gwangju Incident was commented on for the first time at the budget committee of the 11th session of the National Assembly (November 17, 1983) by the Assemblyman Im Jaejeong (Democratic Korea Party, Northeast district of Gwangju); he demanded historical appreciation of the Gwangju Incident and he raised questions to the government asking whereabouts of 700,000,000 won, which was raised for Gwangju citizens in 1980, but the government completely ignored the questions. Like this, Gwangju was regarded as sacred precincts at the 11th session of National Assembly.

At the 12th session of National Assembly in 1985, thanks to the general election on February 12 in which the public consensus displayed its power, New Democratic Party secured 103 seats at the Assembly and rose to the second largest party and at the early part of the session, Assemblymen like I Min-u, Bag Chanjong, Sin Giha mainly discussed about the Gwangju problem, but it was pushed aside in the middle of struggle for party hegemony and by pending problems like amending the constitution for direct election, and it could not make any significant progress, so only the dissidents questioned steadily. The Gwangju Incident was not highlighted in the world of politics until the 13th session of National Assembly of the Sixth Republic convened.

One of the victims of the Gwangju Incident said, Despite the truth of the Gwangju Uprising should be revealed as it was, there is no one who steps forward to say that he is responsible and to take the blame among the generals who were the supreme commanders. The truth of the Gwangju must be one thing, but why it is different each day and each mouth? Who can the people count on? Being incapable of waiting for the government and National Assembly to investigate and reveal the truth, at last, Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement had a press interview at the Christian Hall (Yeonji-dong, Jongro-gu, Seoul) inquiring the commanding system when Gwangju massacre was occurred whether the U.S. intervened in Gwangju massacre; and the background of the Gwangju Uprising.

Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement asserted that the immediate responsibility of Gwangju massacre was on the eight generals such as Jeon Duhwan, No Tae-u, and Bag Junbyeong, who were in the command during the Gwangju massacre, and their doings during the incident should be revealed clearly. The committee urged the government to reveal the proceedings of the meeting that No Tae-u and General Jeong Hoyong decided to extend the Martial Law in the meeting room of the Ministry of Defense on May 16, 1980 and the development of the formation of National Security Committee; and demanded an explanation of the reason deploying paratroops only in Seoul and Gwangju when the Martial Law had enforced on May 17; and it urged the revealing of the doings of Jeong Hoyong the Commander of Special Operations Command of the day, who commanded to fire during the Gwangju Uprising since May 19. Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement already announced in the first investigation report on the Gwangju Uprising on June 30 that, for the total investigation of the charges of the people who are related and for the punishment of them, the eight persons who are immediately responsible for Gwangju massacre shouldn't be allowed to leave the country for a time; as soon as these eight persons' charges were clearly revealed, they must resign from their public offices; all the materials on the commanding system in 1980 should be open to the public; and to clarify the matter of the U.S. intervention in Gwangju massacre and to define who's to blame, the materials of the U.S. Department of State embassy in 1980 must be revealed instantly. And the committee claimed that it is inevitable to summon Wickham, the Commander of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea of the day and Ambassador Gleysteen, who were the accomplices of Gwangju massacre and to investigate the case (Voice of People, no. 53., July 7, 1988).

Now, eight years have passed since the Gwangju Incident, and it seems that it's time to reveal the truth of the Gwangju Incident at last. The Gwangju Incident, which was compared to a nuclear bomb and regarded as sacred precincts since the birth of the Fifth Republic, is standing in front of us as a flaming active volcano to tell us that it is not the issue of yesterday but of today. There is no way to escape from Gwangju.

So have no fear of them; for nothing is covered up that will not be uncovered, and nothing secret that will not become known. What I say to you in the dark, tell in the light; and what you hear whispered, proclaim form the housetops (Matthew 10.26-27).

...... continued from Part 1

Source: http://gshin.chonnam.ac.kr/cnu518/4documents.htm#Part III. Who is responsible
Rights: The May 18 Institute/Prof. Shin